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Abstract
This paper will focus on Israel’s system of government 
with specific attention to the idea of citizenship and to 
its Palestinian-Arab citizenry . It will begin with a histor-
ical and political background of Palestinian-Arab citizens, 
along with an examination of their paradoxical circum-
stances living as non-Jewish citizens in a “Jewish state .” 
The multi-faceted discrimination faced by Palestinian-
Arab citizens is laid out in an attempt to outline the apart-
heid state structure and system that constitutes the Israeli 
regime . The ethnicized nature and structure of Israeli 
citizenship will then be explained, and an analysis of 
the limited access of Palestinian-Arabs to Israeli citizen-
ship through an illustration of the state’s legal definition 
and political characterization as a “Jewish state” will fol-
low . This paper will argue that Israel’s (hardening) ethnic 
policies and practices, coupled with internal Palestinian 
political rifts and resistance, have resulted in a notable 
shrinking space of citizenship . Expanding on this analysis 
of Israeli citizenship and state structure, this paper will 
introduce the concept of statelessness and argue that self-
identification of the Israeli state as “Jewish” repudiates the 
citizenship of the Palestinian-Arab community, rendering 
this collective stateless . The paradoxical status of stateless-
citizenship will be explored to illustrate that this form of 
statelessness is not rooted in the absence of citizenship 
but rather in its presence, thus distinguishing between the 
statelessness of the Arab citizenry of Israel and the rest of 
the Palestinian nation . The paper will end with the applica-
tion of Mark Salter’s metaphor of the border, arguing that, 
as stateless-citizens, Palestinian-Arabs are in a permanent 
state of border exception, the effect of which makes their 
bodies into borders .
Résumé
Le présent article approfondit le système de gouvernement 
de l’État d’Israël en insistant particulièrement sur la notion 
de citoyenneté ainsi que sur ses citoyens arabo-palestiniens . 
L’auteure situe d’abord le contexte historique et politique 
des citoyens arabo-palestiniens et examine ensuite leur 
situation paradoxale de citoyens non juifs dans un « État 
juif » . La discrimination à multiples facettes à laquelle sont 
confrontés les citoyens arabo-palestiniens est exposée dans 
un essai de définition du système et de la structure étatique 
d’apartheid que constitue le régime israélien . La nature et la 
structure ethnicisées de la citoyenneté israélienne sont alors 
expliquées, suivi d’une analyse de l’accès limité des citoyens 
arabo-palestiniens à la citoyenneté israélienne à travers une 
illustration de la définition juridique et de la caractérisation 
politique de l’État comme « État juif » . L’auteure fait valoir 
que les politiques et pratiques ethniques (durcissantes) d’Is-
raël, ainsi que la résistance et les clivages politiques internes 
palestiniens, ont entraîné une diminution notable de l’espace 
de la citoyenneté . En creusant davantage cette analyse de la 
citoyenneté israélienne et de la structure de l’État, l’auteure 
présente le concept de l’apatridie et affirme que l’auto-iden-
tification de l’État d’Israël comme « juif » répudie la citoyen-
neté de la communauté arabo-palestinienne, la rendant 
apatride . Le statut paradoxal de la citoyenneté apatride est 
étudié afin d’illustrer le fait que cette forme d’apatridie n’est 
pas enracinée en une absence de citoyenneté, mais plutôt en 
sa présence, discernant ainsi entre l’apatridie des citoyens 
arabes d’Israël et celle du reste de la nation palestinienne . 
L’auteure termine par l’application de la métaphore de la 
frontière de Mark Salter, faisant valoir que, en tant que 
citoyens apatrides, les Arabo-Palestiniens sont dans un état 
permanent d’exception des frontières, leurs corps étant eux-
mêmes des frontières .
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The Forgotten Palestinians
The nation-state framework is predicated on citizenship as 
the principle organizing relation between the state and its 
constituents, or citizens . As an institution, citizenship is 
comprised of the social community and implies that access 
to public goods and services, as well as participation in state 
institutions, exhibits the political civil and social rights of 
this collective . Indeed, citizenship has emerged as an issue 
which is central, not only to practical political notions con-
cerning access to health-care systems, educational institu-
tions, public programs, and the welfare state, but also to con-
cepts of legal jurisdiction and social membership . Within 
the context of multi-ethnic state systems, practices accom-
modating the political and social dominance of one group 
with the concept of democratic citizenship can be identified . 
Through an analysis of these practices the dynamics of the 
citizenship available to minority or marginalized commun-
ities within a state system surfaces, illustrating the central-
ity of the specific social and political context in determining 
the realization of citizenship rights .
In the case of Israel, Zionism has largely been a terri-
torial and demographic success . History has nearly forgot-
ten the 156,000 Palestinian-Arabs1 who in 1948 remained 
in the areas of historic Palestine now called Israel, and 
were granted Israeli citizenship . The long history of the 
Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel was shaped by the events 
leading up to the 1948 Nakba, or catastrophe, the result of 
which shattered and forcefully separated a community of 
approximately 950,000 people .2 The vast majority of these 
people either were forced from their land or fled under the 
duress of war to neighbouring Arab countries where they 
and their descendants have become the world’s largest and 
oldest refugee population .
During the Nakba, Zionist forces expelled Palestinians 
from approximately 512 villages, from which village prop-
erty such as houses, churches, mosques, grazing fields, cem-
eteries, orchards, cattle, and other properties were confis-
cated by the Zionist forces and either distributed among 
neighbouring Jewish settlements or withheld for the use of 
new Jewish settlements .3 With the Declaration of the state 
of Israel as a simultaneously Jewish and democratic state 
in 1948,4 a policy of spatial Judaization was implemented 
by the Zionist political and military forces aimed at the 
establishment of a demographic balance in favour of the 
Jewish population through mechanisms of “regional” and 
“urban planning .” This policy is fulfilled with a dual and 
simultaneous practice of developing and scattering exclu-
sively Jewish settlements on (and immediately around) 
areas mainly inhabited by Arabs, while limiting and trump-
ing the demographic, geographic, and socio-economic 
growth of Palestinian villages . While terms such as “spatial 
Judaization” have almost disappeared from the current 
discourse of urban planning in Israel, the policies remain 
unchanged and are today replaced by expressions such as 
“attracting populations .”5
Israeli society is composed of two main national collect-
ives, Jews and Palestinian-Arabs . The Palestinian people 
are a mainly Arabic-speaking collective with historical 
and familial origins in historic Palestine . Today one out 
of five citizens in Israel are Palestinian-Arabs, who num-
ber more than one million citizens and constitute 20 .2 per 
cent of Israel’s total population .6 While the Palestinians 
who remained within the boundaries of the new Israeli state 
were granted Israeli citizenship, they were also placed in a 
systematically dependent and inferior economic, political, 
and legal position .7 Indeed, rather than pursuing either 
elimination or integration/absorption of the Palestinian-
Arab community, the Israeli policy has, from the beginning, 
been shaped by the objective of effective control .8
Multi-faceted Discrimination  
in an Apartheid Regime
Discrimination against non-Jewish citizens pervades every 
level of Israeli society, from the private to the public sphere, 
and at social, legal, and political levels . According to As’ad 
Ghanem, the channelling of rights through Israel’s policy 
of Jewish dominance can be analyzed at three different lev-
els: the declarative level, the structural level, and the oper-
ational level . At the formal and declarative levels, the prefer-
ence of Jews over others is both tangible and indisputable . 
Visible symbols such as “official state holidays, state symbols 
and the flag, imposed religious observance, regulated diet-
ary laws, and the legally enshrined definition of the state as 
the state of the Jewish people” are all built upon the premise 
of the social and political dominance of Jewish people and 
completely dismissive of the Palestinian citizenry .9 Indeed, 
although Arabic is also an officially recognized language, 
the Hebrew language is dominant in all spheres of Israeli 
society and while several laws are implemented to promote 
and preserve Jewish culture and create Jewish cultural insti-
tutions, such as The High Institution for Hebrew Language 
Law (1973) among others, no law exists which refers to 
Palestinian-Arab culture, history, or heritage . As a result, 
while Jews are provided legally enshrined rights both as a 
collective and as individual citizens, Arab citizens of Israel 
lack a clear and official legal and formal status in Israel as a 
collective, and fail to identify with the intrinsically Jewish 
and Zionist symbols of the state at an individual level .
At the structural level, Arab citizens of Israel are involun-
tarily excluded from Israeli institutions through various 
methods . To begin with, Arabs are excluded from the pol-
itical decision-making centres . The Arab parties which are 
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anti-Zionist or non-Zionist have historically played the role 
of a “permanent opposition” and have systematically been 
excluded from the important Knesset committees, such as 
Finance and Foreign Affairs, and Defence .10 Further, Arabs 
are systematically denied employment in senior positions, 
and are excluded from the centres of public, social, economic, 
and military power . Instead, special institutions have been 
created and assigned the task of dealing with Arab affairs 
and policy-making . Ghanem notes, “Frequently, these com-
mittees view the Arabs through a security lens and concen-
trate on the potential security risk allegedly correlated with 
ethnic considerations .”11 For instance, Abeer Baker, lawyer 
with Adalah: The Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights 
in Israel points out that when it comes to the treatment 
of Palestinian citizens in political prisons, Israeli prison 
authorities consider Arab political prisoners as security pris-
oners .12 This classification determines a prisoner’s treatment 
by the Israeli Prison Services including the prison to which 
she/he is assigned, the prison wing where she/he will serve 
the sentence, the provision of a leave, guarded home visits, 
and access to telephone calls from prison . Distinguishing 
between criminal and security prisoners was sanctioned 
by the Israeli Supreme Court, and while it is claimed to be 
applied to both Jewish and Arab prisoners, Baker argues 
that in practice it is only Palestinian prisoners who suffer 
the devastating ramifications of being declared security 
prisoners, as Jews imprisoned or detained due to attacks on 
Arabs for ideological reasons continue to benefit from the 
rights provided to criminal prisoners, even if they are offi-
cially classified as security prisoners . Consequently, prison-
ers who are Palestinian citizens of Israel continue to find 
themselves on a “double periphery .” Palestinian political 
prisoners who are Israeli citizens are discriminated against 
as compared to Jewish prisoners in the harsher sentences 
they receive, and in the difficult prison conditions they are 
subjected to . At the same time, Palestinian citizens who are 
incarcerated are excluded from Israeli-Palestinian prisoner-
release agreements and from candidacy for early release as 
their situation is considered as an internal Israeli issue—a 
product of the Oslo Accords .
Finally, at the operative level, Palestinian citizens of 
Israel are denied equality in the realms of budgets, land allo-
cations, and legislation . As equality among citizens is not 
legally entrenched, the Israeli legal system is able to empha-
size the Jewish and Zionist character of the state . Further, 
the World Zionist Organization – Jewish Agency Law of 1952 
guarantees that major Jewish and Zionist organizations are 
granted special status as quasi-governmental bodies . These 
organizations manage land, housing, and service provi-
sion, almost exclusively serving the Jewish population . As 
no non-Jewish organizations are granted similar status this 
state practice produces a remarkably lower quality of life for 
those who are Palestinian-Arab by denying them access to 
basic de facto citizenship rights .
Budgetary discrimination against the Arab commun-
ity fuels the unequal allocation of resources to Arab and 
Jewish local authorities, furthering the laggard economic 
development of the Arabs in Israel .13 In the education sec-
tor, Palestinian-Arabs are refused the right to establish edu-
cational objectives and directions, subjected to discrimina-
tory allocation of state funding and educational resources, 
and severely under-represented in the decision- and policy-
making positions in the Israeli Ministry of Education . The 
Israeli education system is based on the State Education Law 
(1953) . Amended in February 2000, this law sets educational 
objectives for state schools that emphasize Jewish history 
and culture . Stated in Article 2 of the law, the education sys-
tem seeks primarily to advance the understanding of Zionist 
ideology and preserve the Jewish nature of the state by 
teaching its history, culture, and language . As a result, Arab 
state-run schools are faced with a discriminatory curricu-
lum which allots more time to learning the Torah and other 
Jewish and Zionist texts than it does to studying the Qur’an, 
the New Testament, or literature produced by Arab scholars, 
and with inferior allocations for training, supervision, and 
structural, programmatic, and institutional development, 
resulting in poor infrastructure, limited instructors, and 
large numbers of students per classroom .14
When it comes to land allocation, Arabs face widespread 
discrimination in national and regional zoning plans . Ian 
Lustick has widely documented methods employed by the 
state to deprive Palestinians of their land by turning it 
into “state land managed by national and regional plan-
ning bodies .”15 Lustick points out that in 1960, the Basic 
Law: Israel-Lands Law and Israel-Lands Administration 
Law were formulated on behalf of the Israeli government, 
deeming that the land controlled by the Jewish National 
Fund (JNF) would now be administered by a single author-
ity, the Israel Land Administration (ILA) . However, it 
was agreed that “the lands controlled by the ILA shall be 
administered according to the principles of the JNF,” and 
its declared goal of “purchasing and developing land as a 
national resource of the Jewish people, by the Jewish people, 
and for the Jewish people .”16 As such, the ILA is forbidden 
from selling or leasing the land to non-Jews . This extraterri-
torialization of the land places it beyond the control of the 
government, rendering it inaccessible to all Israeli citizens . 
Thus, while, prior to 1948, members of the Palestinian-Arab 
community owned and/or cultivated some 93 to 94 per cent 
of the land in geographical Palestine, today, 93 per cent of 
the territory of Israel is under direct control of the state and 
administered under a land tenure system which continues 
 Stateless Citizenship and the Palestinian-Arabs in Israel 
21
to deny Palestinian-Arabs access in the form of leasing and 
cultivation .
At the legislative level, while the list of discriminatory 
laws is too long to list in this publication alone, there are a 
few which deserve special attention given their dispropor-
tionately devastating effect on the Palestinian-Arab com-
munity . As the most important legal expression of Israel’s 
self-definition as a Jewish state, the Law of Return (1950) 
guarantees “automatic citizenship to any Jew upon immi-
gration to Israel, without any length-of-residence or lan-
guage requirement .”17 The Law of Return applies to any Jew 
looking to immigrate to Israel, to her/his spouse, children, 
grandchildren, and their respective spouses, and applies 
to Jewish immigrants after the establishment of Israel and 
retroactively to Jews who had immigrated to Palestine or 
had been born there before the creation of the state with-
out preconditions . However, Palestinian refugees who were 
expelled from their land and homes in 1948 are not granted 
the Right of Return and not even entitled to residency or cit-
izenship status . In essence, an ethno-nationalist citizenship 
is established through this legal tenet encompassing all Jews, 
and only Jews, by virtue of their ethnic descent . This law 
solidifies the secondary citizenship status of Palestinian-
Arabs as there is no chance for a non-Jew to acquire citizen-
ship through the Ministry of Interior, and even spouses of 
Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel can only gain citizenship 
or residency status thorough complicated and exhausting 
legal procedures .18
Systematic and state-led discrimination at the declarative, 
structural, operational levels illustrates the range of services, 
rights, benefits, and opportunities denied to the Palestinian 
citizenry of Israel by virtue of their non-Jewish ethnic 
affiliation . Such a situation, combining both formally writ-
ten or legal principles and informal political practices, was 
defined by Yasmin Soysal as an “incorporation regime .”19 
This, Soysal argues, refers to “patterns of institutional prac-
tices and more or less explicit cultural norms that define the 
membership of individuals and/or groups in the society and 
differentially allocate entitlements, obligations and domina-
tion .”20 In other words, an incorporation regime is a regime 
of social, political, economic, and cultural institutions that 
stratify the assumed equal or universalist citizenship of the 
state through a differential dispensing of rights, benefits, 
and obligations to various communities .
An examination of Israel’s formal and informal practi-
ces reveals that its incorporation regime is structured in 
the form of an apartheid state system, namely systematic 
discrimination that is legally and institutionally enshrined 
so as to maintain the domination of an “ethnic” or “racial” 
group over another .21 While historically and politically 
associated with the practices and policies of the South 
African apartheid regime from 1948 to 1994, the definition 
of the crime of apartheid in the International Convention on 
the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, 
adopted by the United National General Assembly in 1973, 
points out that the definition of the crime of apartheid 
was not limited to the case of South Africa .22 As Hazem 
Jamjoum points out, that apartheid is defined as a crime 
under the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, enforced long after the apartheid regime was defeated 
in South Africa, attests to the fact that apartheid is a system 
that can be practised by any state .23
Resulting from the apartheid structure of the Israeli legal 
and political regime is a dynamic where, in principle, Israel 
invites its Palestinian citizens to engage in public economic, 
political, cultural, and social life, but it does not offer equality . 
Instead, through apartheid policies and practices the state 
maintains Jewish superiority in all fields, actively elevat-
ing their symbolic, structural, and practical dominance .24 
Israel permits its Palestinian-Arab citizens to exercise basic 
rights, including the right to vote for and be elected to legis-
lative bodies, and the right to freedom of movement, organ-
ization, and expression, however limited . Yet, as mentioned, 
Israel simultaneously adopts apartheid policies of domina-
tion and control that guarantee continued Arab marginality 
in all social, political, and legal spheres, thus incorporating 
this community as citizens without citizenship rights .25
Ethnicized State, Ethnicized Citizenship
The nature of the state is often translated into the charac-
ter of its citizenship . As a movement seeking out a territory 
for colonization and immigration, Zionist politics aimed at 
creating a homogeneous population of largely immigrants 
in Palestine . This Judaization project creates socio-political 
and legal conditions which foster pervasive discrimination 
against non-Jewish citizens and thus which challenge the 
tenets of democratic citizenship .
Citizenship often represents the intersection of law and 
identity, where both an affiliation to a national collective 
and a constitutionally recognized membership in a state are 
articulated . It is conventionally conceived of as a mechan-
ism of civic incorporation within a state; a form of social 
membership used as a basis for claim-making with access to 
rights, privileges, and freedoms allocated and protected by 
state institutions . The concept of citizenship is comprised of 
various articulations of membership and its accompanying 
rights, each of which reflects an analysis of the particular 
ethnic relations within that state .
The discourses of citizenship central to our analysis are 
liberal, republican, and ethno-nationalist, as Israeli cit-
izenship is comprised of an amalgamation of these three 
concepts of state membership .26 The liberal conception of 
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citizenship emphasizes personal liberty, viewing “individ-
uals, and only individuals, as the bearers of universal, equal 
and publicly affirmed rights .”27 Individuals are said to be 
sovereign actors who pursue their personal advantage, and 
given the absence of a sense of obligation to the commun-
ity, political interference by the state is limited to a “nega-
tive” form of engagement, namely, the protection of indi-
viduals from interference in their exercise of inalienable 
rights . In return for this protection, individuals are required 
to engage in minimal political duties, such as voting, pay-
ing taxes, adhering to legal stipulations, and, in the case 
of Israel, serving in the military . Hence, citizenship, in the 
liberal view, consists of a collection of rights aimed at pro-
tecting the individual from encroachment by other mem-
bers of society, including the state, while legitimating the 
state’s authority over individuals .28 However limited, this 
concept of citizenship is reflected in Israel in the ability of 
the state to tolerate religious, cultural, and political divers-
ity by creating a political realm protecting individual rights 
and an institutional framework within which the expression 
of this diversity can develop . In other words, the existence of 
mosques and churches, and the range of organized political 
groups within Israel, however limited, denote traces of a lib-
eral current within Israeli society .
The understanding of citizenship as acquired or real-
ized through identification with and active participation 
in the political community is reflected in the concept of 
republican citizenship . Members of a republican commun-
ity are required to experience, or should experience, their 
citizenship “not intermittently, as merely protective individ-
ual rights, but rather as active participation … in a morally 
inspired life .”29 This concept is reflected in the Israeli case 
through requirements that Jewish citizens complete man-
datory military service in the Israeli Defence Forces . This 
criterion entitles them to a preferential share of the society’s 
resources such as low-interest bank loans, employment, free 
education, free public transportation, and more .
However, mandatory service is limited to the Jewish 
majority, which introduces the third and final dimension of 
citizenship, namely, an ethno-national membership . Ethno-
national citizenship roots membership in a special kind of 
community, the nation or ethnic group, which in this case is 
Jewish . Israel’s legal, political, and ideological self-definition 
as a “Jewish state” adopts an ethnicized understanding of 
citizenship that dominates the limited but existing liberal 
and republican currents in its society . Ethnicized Israeli 
citizenship is “not an expression of individual rights but of 
membership in a homogenous ethnic group .”30 This system-
atically denies access to the aforementioned social resour-
ces to non-Jews, or those outside this ethnicized collective . 
Indeed, while a small number of Druze and Arab-Christian 
recruits were recently allowed entry into the Israeli military, 
indicating republican tendencies in Israel’s conception of 
citizenship, these individuals are denied access to the full 
range of privileges that come with military service which 
are otherwise provided to Jewish soldiers, further illustrat-
ing its ethno-national framework .31
An explanation of the ethnicized nature and structure of 
Israeli citizenship goes back to the beginning of the Zionist 
settlement project during the British Mandate of Palestine 
(hereafter Palestine) at the end of the nineteenth century . 
Israeli political theorist Baruch Kimmerling argues that 
Zionism, the nationalist movement that motivated the 
Jewish immigration and settlement in Palestine, developed 
from the historical matrix of “traditional global colonial-
ism .”32 Kimmerling points out, however, that Zionism was 
“sophisticated enough to distance itself” from traditional 
global colonialism through an emphasis on the “uniqueness 
of the Jewish problem: anti-Semitism, persecution, and later 
the Holocaust .”33 Presenting itself as the sole moral solution, 
the Jewish immigration movement was able to expound 
itself as a return to Zion to correct years of injustice against 
the Jewish people, thus disconnecting itself from European 
colonial movements in other continents .34 Indeed, since the 
establishment of a “Jewish state in Eretz-Israel” in 1948, a 
political culture emerged in Israel that may be analyzed as 
a pattern of interaction between the exclusionary aspects of 
its colonizing and nation-building practices, and the inclu-
sionary dimensions of its state institutions .35
A State for All of Its Jewish Citizens
The understanding of citizenship adopted in this paper 
is not simply a collection of formal and legally enshrined 
rights . Rather, citizenship also involves the entire mode of 
incorporating individuals and collectives into the societal 
order . This highlights the role of specific state institutions 
in facilitating social inclusion and draws attention to the 
variety, range, and dynamics of this membership . Although 
citizenship is meant to confer rights to all of its members—
whose status is formulated against a non-member, or an 
other—access to those rights is not equal . Like other forms 
of inequality, access to citizenship rights should also be 
understood as resulting from an intersection of multiple 
axes of difference . To name a few, these axes include nation-
ality, religion, gender, class, and legal status, are channelled 
through a variety of democratic state institutions, and oper-
ate to constrain and facilitate access to civic rights even in 
the presence of citizenship status . Through this arrangement 
of citizenship status and access to rights, it becomes evident 
that citizenship rights in Israel are channelled through 
sophisticated ethnicized policies of exclusion, allied with 
limited inclusion in all spheres of life . These policies fuel 
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and are fuelled by the absence of a provision in Israeli law 
for the concept of constitutional equality . Equality is absent 
from The Basic Law,36 and while laws exist which protect 
the equal rights of disadvantaged groups such as women 
and the disabled, no general statute relates to the right to 
equality for all citizens .37
In fact, although the definition of the Israeli state is con-
tinually contested, movements within Israel to amend the 
wording of The Basic Law since 1985 so that the state of 
Israel is “the state of its citizens” or “the state of the Jewish 
people and its Arab Citizens” have consistently been voted 
down by Israeli Knesset members .38 Indeed, an examina-
tion of two controversial resolutions initiated in 2009 in the 
Knesset indicates that, rather than being a right, meaningful 
citizenship for a Palestinian-Arab is considered a constitu-
tional privilege, conditional on the negation of her/his eth-
nic identity and claim to equal rights . The first is the Jewish 
and Democratic State Bill, which criminalizes any political 
expression which challenges the Jewish or Zionist nature 
of the state .39 With this legislation, efforts to secure equal 
legal and political status for Palestinian-Arabs by high-
lighting the discriminatory legal and political outcomes of 
Israel’s total preference for its Jewish citizens are criminal-
ized and rendered a maximum prison sentence of one year . 
An amendment to the Citizenship Law of 1952 is the second, 
and it requires anyone receiving Israeli citizenship by birth 
or naturalization, as well as any citizen or resident applying 
for a national identity card, to make the following pledge of 
loyalty:
I declare my allegiance to the state of Israel as a Jewish and Zionist 
state, to the principles of the declaration made upon establishment 
of the state of Israel, to the state’s flag and its hymn . I promise to 
perform compulsory service or alternative service as specified by 
statute .40
This bill is discriminatory in two important ways: it author-
izes the Minister of Interior to revoke the citizenship of 
Israeli citizens who do not complete military or alternative 
national service; thus serving as an attack against conscien-
tious objectors refusing to partake in Israeli human rights 
violations against the Palestinian people, and it compels 
Palestinian Arabs to recognize the Jewish character of the 
state and swear loyalty to the values of Zionism .
This nexus of liberal and ethno-national currents in 
Israeli legal and political structures has sparked widespread 
debates among scholars attempting to define Israeli dem-
ocracy . The debate in Israeli academia was initially dom-
inated by two major approaches . The mainstream account 
pushed forward by Israeli thinkers such as Asher Arian and 
Yaron Ezrahi followed the outlook of the Israeli High Court 
of Justice and considered the state to be a liberal democ-
racy, albeit with certain deficiencies . The second approach 
was advanced by scholars such as Sammy Smooha and Yoav 
Peled, who define Israel as an “ethnic democracy,” discern-
ing persistent and systematic inequalities between Arabs 
and Jews, particularly in the exercise of collective rights 
but also in the overall democratic framework guarantee-
ing basic civil rights .141 However, these approaches could 
not account for the structural divisions which reproduced 
the existing ethnic and religious inequalities . This led to the 
emergence of a third approach led by both Arab and Jewish 
scholars—and one whose conclusions are expanded on in 
this paper to apply the apartheid analysis to the Israeli state 
system—which includes Nadim Rouhana, As’ad Ghanem, 
and Oren Yiftachel, all of whom define Israel as an “ethnoc-
racy … ethnic state … or imagined democracy .”42 These 
thinkers uncovered the range of structural impediments 
to Israel’s consolidation as a stable liberal democratic state, 
highlighting the nature of Israel as “not only Jewish, but also 
a Judaizing regime with ongoing policies and practices of 
expanding and deepening Jewish control” over economic 
and territorial resources within the state .43
From Citizens to “Stateless Citizens”
Uneven allocation is legitimated through the way in which 
social membership is conceived and granted within the 
state . In the case of Israel, its status as a Jewish state is 
not only a source of identity but it is also the guarantor of 
Jewish-identity-based rights . This is because Jewish identity 
in Israel provides an entirely new set of rights irrespective 
of formal citizenship . In other words, Jewish identity within 
the state of Israel is automatically conflated with Israeli cit-
izenship . Like other incorporation regimes, Israeli citizen-
ship is composed of concentric circles within which the 
boundaries of civic status for the Palestinian community 
are distinctly rigid given their peripheral location .44 And 
so, this community is limited to a rigid citizenship located 
in the periphery, as any possibility for movement towards 
the centre requires a social mobility that is systematically 
denied to it by virtue of the self-definition of the state—
and such rights—as Jewish . The fruition of social mobility 
requires more rights and greater access to resources, the 
denial of which reduces the prospects of any meaningful 
Arab citizenship .
For the most part, this is where the existing literature 
stops . The existing literature largely agrees that the most 
important factor in delineating the contours of the rela-
tionship between Israel and its Arab minority is the con-
stitutionally enshrined ethnic exclusivity of the state . The 
self-definition of the “nation” as Jewish is deemed a sig-
nificant determinant of the relationship between the state 
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of Israel and its Palestinian citizenry, and is a response to 
more external developments, namely, the Israel-Palestine 
conflict . Citizenship rights are thus denied to Arab citizens 
of Israel through a multi-faceted system of institutional 
and social control, leaving them with mere citizenship 
status, or citizenship in the law . While these conclusions 
are accepted in this paper, an examination of the implica-
tions of the designation of this community as citizens gives 
rise to a larger paradox . The self-identification of the state 
as an essentially Jewish state, with a national Jewish iden-
tity, and a demographic caveat requiring a Jewish majority 
within the territories under Israeli control, complicates any 
political, national, identity, or membership ties between the 
state and the Arab citizenry . The constitutional self-defin-
ition of the state as Jewish—since it requires the adoption of 
structural and institutional policies of domination and con-
trol—repudiates the citizenship of the Arab community . In 
essence, the Palestinians in Israel become a paradox: state-
less citizens . Thus, the challenge to Israel’s consolidation as 
an equal democracy is not that citizenship rights were inad-
equate or unequal, but that access to citizenship itself, in the 
form of state identification or membership, is deliberately 
designed to exclude the non-Jewish community .
The Arabs in Israel are denied national-membership as 
non-Jews, and state-membership given Israel’s legal, polit-
ical, and social self-definition as a state for the Jewish people . 
At the same time, this community is also distanced from the 
rest of the Palestinian-Arab community through the same 
legal, political, social dimensions . As argued by Arendt, 
the only substitute for a home that is offered by a regime 
of nation-states is “an internment camp, a site of prolonged 
homelessness, an institutionalized limbo,” or stateless-
ness .45 What is unique in this case is that the statelessness 
of the Arabs in Israel is not in the absence of citizenship, but 
rather the presence of citizenship status . It is not the self-
identification of the state as belonging to a single, specific 
ethnic community with legal and institutional mechanisms 
in place to exclude all non-Jews from Israeli citizenship 
that excludes Palestinians . Paradoxically, it is their inclu-
sion into what is essentially an exclusive legal and political 
state which fosters their exclusion from state membership . 
This paper begins where the existing literature ended, and 
conceptualized Arabs as citizens without citizenship rights . 
Yet an examination of the framework of Israeli citizenship 
within the definition of a Jewish state reveals that citizen 
status itself becomes repudiated or withdrawn as it does not 
include the Arab population within the state-citizen rela-
tionship . One witnesses the development of new form of cit-
izenship stemming from the self-identification of the state 
as a Jewish state: stateless citizen status .
Becoming the Borders of the “Jewish State”
With this analysis, a familiar arrangement surfaces where, 
like all Palestinians, the Palestinians inside Israel too are 
rendered stateless . The differing element is that it is cit-
izenship which serves as their entry into statelessness . It is 
important to note here that this paper does not seek to assert 
that the stateless Palestinian citizens of Israel are of equal 
political, legal, or socio-economic status as those stateless 
Palestinians in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or refugee camps 
and legal limbo around the Arab and non-Arab world . 
However limited, there are significant privileges, such as 
mobility rights, granted to the Palestinian-Arab commun-
ity through their inclusion in the discourse of rights as 
citizens of Israel which are vehemently denied to the rest 
of the Palestinian community . Rather, the statelessness of 
the Arabs in Israel outlined in this paper is most accurately 
reflected in Mark Salter’s account of the experience of the 
“neurotic citizen at a border examination .”46 Salter delineates 
an “embedded confessionary complex” faced by the citizen 
at the border which, rather than viewed as a “simple line 
indicating the limits of sovereign jurisdiction,” is defined 
as “performative .”47 Salter asserts that “border agents and 
state bureaucrats play a critical role in determining where, 
how, and on whose body a border will be performed,” and 
with this verdict, these representatives establish the border 
as a permanent state of exception .48 Border examinations 
compel citizens to perform both their citizenship and the 
sovereignty of the state, placing them in an indefinite state 
of exception .
Salter’s metaphor of the border is more reflective of the 
political and legal realities of the Palestinian citizens of 
Israel than Giorgio Agamben’s conception of the camp .49 
While Arabs citizens of Israel are not residing in actual 
refugee camps, they are in a permanent state of border 
exception, the effect of which makes their bodies into bor-
ders . Salter states, the “law is always at its limit at the border, 
because the decision of entrance to the territory and corres-
pondent membership in the community is the equivalent to 
force .”50
The borders of the state of Israel are enacted on and 
through the bodies of Palestinian-Arabs as stateless cit-
izens . While present in what is internationally recognized 
as the territory of the state because of their formal citizen-
ship status, Palestinians inside Israel lack a solid relation-
ship with and membership in either the Israeli “nation” or 
state given its self-definition as Jewish . As stated by Oren 
Yiftachel, because the state of Israel is “defined (non-ter-
ritorially) as Jewish, and Arabs can never become Jewish, 
their right to citizenship is structurally (and indirectly also 
territorially) denied .”51 Thus, Israel is a Jewish state and, as 
non-Jews, Arab citizens define the limits of the borders of 
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the state . This dynamic becomes particularly interesting 
when one notes that Israel is the only internationally recog-
nized state in the world without borders .52
The only ethic governing the border, and by extension 
the bodies of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, is what Salter 
calls the “Machiavellian ‘virtue’ of security … a narrative 
of sovereign protection that obscures the running state of 
exception at the border .”53 Through the application of a 
security discourse, Israel has systematically denied its Arab 
citizenry access to social, political, and economic benefits 
including access to land, resources, and high-ranking polit-
ical and legal state posts, among other benefits . Rather than 
serving as an exception to the fact, the security rhetoric 
directed at Palestinian citizens reflects a permanent amal-
gamation by the state of the physical and conceptual pres-
ence of this community with the notion of an existential 
threat . The actions of the state of Israel constantly merge 
the existence and inclusion of the Arab community within 
its boundaries with the notion of a “security threat .” And so, 
as this decision is always made at the border according to 
Salter, the bodies of the Arabs in Israel effectively become 
the borders of the “nation” of Israel, and the state .
Through motions for equal citizenship and access to its 
associated rights Arab citizens are repeatedly asking for rec-
ognition from the state, but in doing so as non-Jews, they are 
simultaneously eroding its fundamental character as Jewish, 
thus posing an existential threat to the state . Reacting to 
these movements as measures of self-defense, the state of 
Israel establishes bureaucracies of admission and expulsion 
in an attempt to maintain its Judaized dominance and sover-
eign power, and in doing so, reinforces its borders upon and 
against the Palestinian community . Although there are sig-
nificant differences between the political, military, and legal 
measures employed by Israel against Palestinians within its 
formally recognized borders and those in what is called the 
Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), namely the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip, the fundamental sovereign perform-
ance remains similar . That said, there are well-documented 
cases of the use of force against Palestinian citizens of Israel 
reminiscent of that launched against those in the OPT . For 
instance, in October 2000 (during the Second Intifada) the 
resentment of Palestinian-Arab citizens of Israel towards 
the state culminated in street demonstrations protesting 
both the illegal occupation of the Palestinian territories and 
the institutional discrimination of Israel’s Arab citizenry . 
By the end of ten days of violence, thirteen Palestinian-
Arab citizens were killed, and hundreds were injured by 
Israeli police or Israeli Jews . Over the course of the next 
few months, human rights organizations reported trends of 
arbitrary arrest and detention, as well as inhumane treat-
ment of Arab citizens in custody, reflective of the exact 
measures faced by those in the OPT, thus highlighting the 
military, political, legal, and conceptual parallels between 
the Israel’s treatment of its Palestinian citizens and those 
formally under occupation in the Palestinian territories .
Perhaps most reflective of the paradox lived by 
Palestinians with Israeli citizenship is Salter’s contention of 
a citizen that is “always already and never fully inscribed 
as part of the population .”54 As Israeli citizens they are 
uprooted as non-Jews, both in the conceptual and political 
sense, and simultaneously defined as a threatening other to 
the state . Palestinian refugees are enemies of the state both 
inside and outside its borders, as their existence reminds the 
sovereign of exceptions to membership in the nation-state 
framework and thus exceptions to its rule (and in the case of 
Israel, the refugee issue uproots its historical denial of eth-
nic cleansing campaigns during the course of its establish-
ment) . Palestinian stateless citizens of Israel instead become 
the border and are never realized as fully inside or outside 
the state .
The boundaries of Palestinian-Arab citizenship have 
been drawn to create a consciousness among Jews and 
Arabs alike that the citizenship of Palestinian-Arab is in 
certain respects not real or, at best, temporary . Indeed, a 
deconstruction of the Israeli incorporation regime and 
the ambiguous concept of a Jewish and democratic state is 
needed, and has been attempted by this paper, to provide an 
avenue for an inclusive political and legal status, encompass-
ing a meaningful citizenship for Palestinian-Arabs . Such an 
initiative would erase the political and conceptual borders 
embedded in the bodies of the Arab citizenry and destabil-
ize the paradoxical status of stateless citizenship .
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